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You know I suppose it's only because I'm a law professor that I take 
joy in coming back to this room where thirteen years ago as a first year law 
student I sat where you now sit in the afternoons for my course on Public 
Law. I'm glad to be back and I am very happy to be here to talk to you 
about some very important issues that I think affect all of us and affect our 
legal system, whether or not we're Asian American, whether or not we're 
racial minorities. 
Law professors, as you know, always like to make three points when 
they talk. So I am going to make three points this afternoon in discussing 
the Wen Ho Lee case. First, I would like to give you a very brief summary 
of this spectacularly failed federal criminal prosecution. Second, I would like 
to talk about the racial profiling that was used in this case. Third, and finally, 
I would like to talk about the possibilities for Asian Americans and other 
racial minorities to engage in principled activism to overcome these unfor-
tunate trends. 
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Clinical Center, Howard Univer-
sity Law School. B.A. 1988, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1991, University of Michigan 
Law School. This speech was presented on April 2, 2001 at the University of Michigan 
Law School as part of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law's Speaker Series. 
135 
136 Michigan Journal oj Race & Law [VOL. 7:135 
1. THE WEN Ho LEE CASE 
Let me begin though by summarizing a little bit of this case. You 
may recall that for more than a year there were spectacular allegations that 
Wen Ho Lee, a 60-year-old physicist, who had been forced to retire from 
the Los Alamos National Labs, where research and development work is 
conducted on our nuclear arsenal, was the so-called "Chinese spy."! This 
individual, working in the top secret Division X of the Los Alamos Labs, 
supposedly had downloaded hundreds of pages of top secret data, weap-
ons design information and surreptitiously and illegally passed it on to 
the communist Chinese government.2 For more than a year he sat in soli-
tary confinement, allowed very few visitors, shackled at the hands and feet 
with a light bulb burning overhead at all hours, and under constant sur-
veillance. He was said to have given away the "crown jewels" of our 
nuclear arsenal. 3 
This was supposed to have been the worst breach of national secu-
rity since the Rosenberg case some fifty years ago. 4 Yet, as quickly as the 
case against Wen Ho Lee had developed, it then evaporated. The federal 
government eventually agreed to a plea bargain where Wen Ho Lee was 
found to be guilty of one count that had nothing to do with espionage 
but that had to do merely with negligently mishandling data. He was sen-
tenced to time already served.5 
Now this case was spectacular, not only because of its collapse, but 
also because of the reasons for its collapse. When the U.S. District Court 
Judge Parker, a Republican appointee, not a radical on matters of race, 
approved of the plea bargain, he said from the bench that this case, he 
thought, shamed the nation;6 that the government's prosecutorial conduct 
here represented overreaching;7 that it was overly zealous8 and he raised 
questions about whether or not Wen Ho Lee had been the victim of se-
lective prosecution and double standards.9 
1. See, e.g. , James Risen, Inquires Why Suspect At Atom Lab Kept Access, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 
23,1999,atA7. 
2. See Matthew Purdy, The Making if a Suspect: The Case if l#n Ho Lee, NY TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2001, at AI; Matthew Purdy and James Sterngold, The Prosecution Unravels:The Case 
ofl#n Ho Lee, Feb. 5, 2001, NY TIMES, atA1. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., James Sterngold, US. to Reduce Case Against Sdentist to a Single Charge, 
N.YTIMES, Sept. 11,2000, atA1. 
6. See Robert Scheer, No Defense: How the New York Times Convicted l#n Ho Lee, 
NATION, Oct. 23, 2000, at 11,12. 
7. See id. 
8. See id.; Purdy, supra note 2. 
9. Scheer, supra note 6, at 12. 
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Now if you look a little deeper at the case, if you look beyond the 
surface allegations, you find the sort of smoking gun evidence that you 
always wish for in trying to prove discrimination cases like this but which 
is hard to find. For example, Robert Vrooman, a former CIA agent who 
was the head of counter-intelligence at the Los Alamos Labs, said in pub-
lic statements and in a sworn affidavit that there was no doubt in his 
mind that Wen Ho Lee was selected for investigation, in part because of 
his racial and ethnic background. 10 This statement, a brave statement to be 
made by a law enforcement official, is the equivalent of a sheriff or the 
head of some police department coming forward and admitting to racial 
profiling and stopping Mrican American motorists on the highway. This 
was a statement that came from one of the people in charge of the inves-
tigation itself, who said that his colleagues, in pursuing this individual, 
targeted the individual, despite hundreds if not thousands of other leads 
that were not followed up despite numerous studies that showed that the 
Department of Energy in its labs had faulty security procedures. II Despite 
the fact that Wen Ho Lee's own wife worked as an FBI informant, they 
picked this single person to investigate because they feared that nuclear 
warhead plans had been lost to China; a claim which some have found 
not to be credible.12 
Independent studies, including one by a congressionally appointed 
oversight committee, chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman, con-
cluded that the evidence was speculative at best and that there had not 
even been any breach of our nuclear weapons data and loss of that data. 13 
Nonetheless, Vrooman's stepping forward to say that the target of investi-
gation was targeted because of race is an extraordinary statement, for here 
you have an admission of selective prosecution by someone working for 
the prosecution team. 
Not only that, there is a clear case of double standards in this case, 
which is so difficult to prove in most cases. At roughly the same time that 
Wen Ho Lee was incarcerated, was being deprived of his civil rights, the 
former Director of the CIA,John Deutch, admitted that he had commit-
ted similar transgressions-downloading highly sensitive data onto a 
laptop computer that was not secured, taking that computer home with 
him and accessing the World Wide Web and going to various websites, 
and signing on and downloading data and rendering the data on his lap-
top-jeopardizing the most highly, confidential, classified information 
10. See, e.g., James Risen, Officials Disagree on How Lab Scientist Became Spy Suspect, 
N.YTIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at AI, 24; Scheer, supra note 6, at 18. 
11. See Purdy, supra note 2. 
12. See id;Vernon Leoh &Walter Pincus, Guilty Plea, Release Leave Unresolved Questions 
in Lee Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,2000, atA12. 
13. See David A.Vise,Justice Study Faults FBI in Spy Case; I#n Ho Lee Probe too Slow 
and Sloppy, Report Says, WASH. POST, May 19,2000, at AI. 
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that the government has, vulnerable to a breach of security.14 The same 
problem with mishandling top-secret data is present as in the allegations 
against Wen Ho Lee. The difference: Deutch, who also was foreign-born, 
was not prosecuted. Instead, a cover-up was engaged in by some of his 
cronies at the CIA-something which was then later revealed, and at the 
very moment when he otherwise would have pled guilty also to a single 
count he was pardoned by President Clinton in the final round of par-
dons before Clinton left the White House. 15 
What's interesting, then, about this case is that while a low level re-
searcher who is a racial minority, who is the only person of Asian descent 
working in his division at Los Alamos Labs, faces the possibility not just 
of life imprisonment but of the death penalty,16 a White male who is at 
the top of the establishment, who has committed the same breach, is let 
off with a slap on his wrist. 
We also found out, through the testimony of various people in-
volved with the prosecution of this case as the judge looked into these 
claims, that there had been this targeting on the basis of race, that the FBI 
in administering polygraph tests had lied not just to Wen Ho Lee but to 
the American public. They had said that this individual failed polygraph 
tests when in fact he had passed them. They had reminded him of the fate 
of the Rosenbergs, who were sent to their deaths, and tried to coerce out 
of him a confession, despite his efforts to help them before he realized 
that he was the target of their scrutiny.17 So this was truly an unusual case 
and it offers a rare glimpse into the activities of law enforcement when it 
is investigating sensitive matters with racial overtones. 
II. RACIAL PROFILING 
Let me now turn to the second part of my talk: racial profiling. I ap-
proach this topic as someone who believes quite strongly and fervently 
that Wen Ho Lee was done a wrong, a grievous wrong, by his own gov-
14. See, e.g., Deutch Faces New Security Inquiry, Documents Show, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2000, atAI. 
15. See id.; Deutch Seeks Plea Deal in Security Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,2001, at A12; 
Secrets l#ren't Compromised in Deutch Case, Pentagon Finds, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A20. 
16. See 18 U.S.c. § 2381 (2001).The statute reads: 
Id. 
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them 
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the 
United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or 
shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but 
not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office in the 
United States. 
17. See Purdy, supra note 2; Scheer, supra note 6, at 20. 
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ernment, and that his lawyers worked a miracle in persuading the prose-
cution to accept the plea bargain and then the judge, that this wrong had 
been done. Let me say, though, this: That the responses in explaining what 
was wrong in the government's conduct have been seriously flawed. So 
while I agree that the government's conduct was wrong, I'd like to sug-
gest that most of the discussion of this issue has entirely missed the point. 
That is, those individuals who have tried to criticize the government or 
defend Wen Ho Lee have misunderstood the nature of the problem. 
The nature of the problem is this: Racial profiling-that is the use of 
race by the government in its law enforcement-can be rational but 
wrong. It's important to understand that distinction between whether an 
act is rational and whether it is wrong. How an action can be both ra-
tional yet at the same time wrong, illegal or unconstitutional. 
In talking about racial profiling let me make three subpoints. The 
first subpoint is this: We all do it. The second subpoint is in some in-
stances racial profiling is rational or at least plausible; it passes a common 
sense test. The third subpoint is rationality is no defense. 
A. Hie All Do It 
Let me first talk about all of us engaging in racial profiling. Let me 
give you some simple examples of the ways in which we engage in racial 
profiling. We do this, if, for example, we're at the airport and we need to 
find someone who speaks a foreign language. I'm often traveling and I'm 
often at airports where there are a large number of Asians. Not Asian 
Americans but Asian Asians, people not whose ancestors but who them-
selves are from Asia. Tourists, business people, traveling here in the United 
States with limited English proficiency and quite often, as is true with 
tourists or business people from anywhere else, they're lost. They need 
help. They need to know how to use the telephone or where the bath-
room is or how to find their rental car or their friends. Not everyday and 
not every time I fly, but often enough-two, three, five times a year-
some Asian stranger will pick me out of the crowd as I'm walking 
through an airp.ort and come up to me and start talking to me in Chinese 
or Japanese or Korean or some other Asian language. They will pick me, 
in particular, ignoring all the other individuals who walk by who are 
White or African American. 
This is a simple form of racial profiling. They believe that it is much 
more likely that I, as someone who looks Asian, will have some sort of 
linguistic understanding; will be able to speak the language or at least 
muddle through; that I am a better bet for them than someone who is 
Caucasian or African American, despite the fact that my Mandarin Chi-
nese is that of about a five year old and there are plenty of people who 
are White or who are African American who can speak Asian languages 
fluently. Nonetheless, if you had to pick, if you looked at the people 
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sitting in this audience and asked "Who is most likely to be able to speak 
Chinese or Japanese or Korean?"; if you had only one person you could 
pick to help you out, you would have to be willful or obstinate not to 
pick someone with an Asian face. I make this point because I think it's 
important to understand the ways in which it's easy to make inferences; 
the ways in which we rely on race. We rely on generalizations all the time 
and not all of those are invidious. They can be, but not all of them are. 
The point is simply this: That now, in addition to the old fashioned 
form of racial discrimination, a form of bias which simply seeks to subju-
gate people, there is another form of so-called rational discrimination and 
there are people who actually argue in favor of this. You can read the 
work of Nobel laureate Gary Becker;18 you can read Richard Posner's 
work;19 you can look at the work of Richard Epstein in Forbidden 
Groundsl° or that of Clint Bolick,21 an advocate against affirmative action, 
or that of Dinesh DeSouza,22 all of who argue that irrational discrimina-
tion is wrong and should be avoided because it's inefficient. That is, when 
people make assumptions that turn out to be wrong for the most part, 
that's bad. But when people make assumptions that turn out to be right, 
for the most part, or right more often than not, then it's acceptable. In-
deed, it's something we should praise and encourage and avoiding it 
would be inefficient behavior. We would cease to be rational actors. 
This process of making assumptions based on race is the dilemma of 
the cabbie, who driving through a major city late at night looks at the 
fare standing at the street corner in the rain and sees that it's an African 
American male between eighteen and forty-five and passes that person 
up to pick up the White passenger a block further down the street. It's 
that sort of behavior which these writers not only condone, but encour-
age. Because this sort of behavior, they believe, is not intended to 
subjugate a people. Rather, it is using one trait, that of race, as a proxy for 
another trait, that of likely status as a felon or a criminal or likely conduct 
that is a propensity to engage in violent behavior. So they argue this is 
different than discriminating against a group without a "rational" reason. 
B. Rationality of Radal Profiling 
Now, in explaining why racial profiling is still wrong, I think it's im-
portant for us to understand that sometimes the pro-profiling arguments 
18. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1971). 
19. See RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 615-26 (1986). 
20. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, 59-78 (1992). 
21. See CLINT BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD: CAN WE RESTORE 1HE AMERI-
CAN CIVIL RICHTSVISION? (1996). 
22. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY 245-87, 297,539 (1995). 
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at least have a certain surface rationality. That takes me to my second sub-
point: The rationality of racial discrimination in some instances. It is not 
easy to dismiss some of these arguments. For example, though I think that 
the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II was a tremen-
dous wrong in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, I think it's also 
difficult to deny that at least it is plausible that Japanese Americans in the 
time of war might have some slightly greater propensity to be loyal to 
Japan than the United States, at least as compared to citizens of other ra-
cial backgrounds. Now don't misunderstand me here. I am strongly 
against the internment, against the prosecution of Wen Ho Lee, and 
against racial profiling of African American motorists as could possibly 
be-as I hope to explain and as I hope you'll see in a moment. But I'm 
against it not on the grounds of irrationality and I think that to argue this 
sort of conduct is irrational and utterly absurd and lacks any factual foun-
dation is to make the wrong argument, because then what happens when 
you make that argument is you implicitly concede that when there is a 
rational basis the conduct is justified. You are then vulnerable whenever 
someone at least has a factual foundation, a plausible basis for a credible 
argument. They will have trapped you.You failed to have a fallback argu-
ment if all you say is this conduct is irrational. Because then you are 
attacking the very rationality of what someone has to say and engaged in 
what I would regard as an unwinnable argument about what the facts are 
rather than a legal argument or a moral argument or an argument over 
what the principles should be. That takes me to my third subpoint: What 
is wrong with the prosecution of Wen Ho Lee? What is wrong with ra-
cial profiling? 
C. Mat Is Wrong With Racial Profiling? 
I would like to give you six arguments as to what is wrong with ra-
cial profiling. 
1. Attack the Premises 
First, there is the easy argument, which is the premises don't ob-
tain-the premises aren't true. In other words, you could accept that 
where behavior is rational, you should engage in that behavior. But then 
argue these premises aren't true. It isn't factually true that Japanese 
Americans are more likely to be loyal to Japan than the United States. Or 
it isn't true that there is a greater likelihood of that among Japanese 
Americans than among Whites. Or you could argue there is no reason to 
suspect that Wen Ho Lee would be more disloyal to the United States as a 
naturalized citizen from Taiwan than someone similarly situated who is 
White and native born. 
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You could contest the premises and that is an important argument to 
have. You should have that argument. But sometimes that argument is 
vulnerable. The Wen Ho Lee prosecution is vulnerable because there is at 
least some evidence that the government of China targeted, in its re-
cruitment of potential spies and potential informants and sources of 
information, people of Chinese ancestry. So that allows the government 
to say "Well we're merely being defensive. We don't want to stereotype. 
We don't want to be racially biased. We don't want to be prejudiced, but 
after all, if the Chinese government is doing this we're only playing de-
fense. We're only responding to what someone else is doing." This is the 
argument that was made by a former army intelligence officer who I de-
bated on CNN, for example. He argued that if the Chinese government 
does this it makes perfect sense for the U.S. government to respond in 
turn.23 So sometimes you can't contest the premise as strongly or as 
strenuously as you would like because there is a factual problem for you 
there. 
Nonetheless, there are five other reasons that I think are quite com-
pelling for rejecting racial profiling even when it is rational. So 
understand that this is a more robust argument. It allows you to make a 
strategic concession. You can say "I admit that there is at least a plausible 
basis for you to suspect this person rather than that person." For example, 
you find sometimes the same argument is made with reference to African 
Americans and the overall statistics of people who are incarcerated. Peo-
ple look at the incarceration rates and argue that African American men 
are incarcerated at much higher rates than White men. Of course they 
disregard the causes, disregard possible prejudice within the criminal jus-
tice system. They say, nonetheless, "We at least know that there are higher 
rates of incarceration." 
You see this same problem, for example, with respect to alienage. 
Asian Americans are often offended by the assumption that we're foreign-
ers. It creates this notion of being a perpetual foreigner. When people ask 
"Where are you from?" they don't accept your answer .... [S]ometimes 
when I say I was born in Cleveland and grew up near Ann Arbor, used to 
live in San Francisco and now live in Washington, D. c., people shake 
their heads and say "No, I mean where are you 'really' from?" That addi-
tion of the word really, a question that they ask only of people who look 
to them foreign, is selective, but in some ways has a rational basis. For af-
ter all, two-thirds of all Asians in the United States are foreign born.24 So 
23 Talk Back Live: J.#n Ho Lee: Did the Government Mishandle the Case? (CNN 
television broadcast, Sept. 27, 2000), transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0009127/tl.00.html; see also Stuart A. Harrington, Is J.#n Ho Lee a Tar-
nished Martyr?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 2000, at B7. 
24. See LISA LOLLOCK, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN IRE UNITED STATES: MARCH 
2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CURRENT POPULATION REp. No. P20-534 (2000); U.S. CENSUS 
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it is not just that there are higher rates of foreign birth among the Asian 
Americans than among White Americans. An absolute majority of people 
who are Asian American are in fact foreign born. 
So, what then makes that question still offensive? What makes it of-
fensive to say to me "How do you like it in our country?" or "When are 
you going home?" or "My, you speak English so well." What is it about 
those statements that despite their rationality troubles us? Let me suggest 
that there are a variety of things that properly do trouble us. 
2. Racial Profiling is Not Objective 
The second reason that racial profiling is wrong is that you have to 
accept on good faith that the person who is engaged in what they claim 
to be rational discrimination, in fact, is objective. You must assume that 
the person engaged in racial profiling has done an analysis and is using 
statistics or is using some real evidence rather than just acting out of 
prejudice. Unfortunately, all too often, you find out that their analysis of 
the facts turns out to coincide neatly with their prejudice. In other words, 
they went in with one view and came out with that same view. So some-
times though their sincerity may not be doubted, nonetheless, the good 
faith of their conclusions may be suspect. 
3. Racial Profiling Frustrates the Value of Being Color-Blind 
Third, racial profiling is emphatically not color-blind and does not 
treat us as individuals. Note that you cannot be at the same time a ra-
tional discriminator and a proponent of color-blindness. It is impossible. 
You must choose. So for those individuals who claim that they would like 
to follow the words of the late Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. when 
he said that he had a dream that we not be judged by the color of our 
skin but by the content of our character, those individuals who profess 
their faith in those inspirational words cannot then turn around and say 
"But I make an exception and engage in rational discrimination when it 
suits me." 
So, rational discrimination and color-blindness as an ideal are con-
tradictory. For what rational discrimination does is it lumps us together 
and says we will treat individuals as members of groups and use aggregate 
statistics and deduce based on generalizations what is true about this per-
son or that person. Not because we know anything about this person or 
that person, but rather because we know about their membership within 
a racial group. 
BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES: 
2ooo,Table DP-l (2000). 
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4. Racial Profiling is Often Based on Bad Information 
Fourth, rational discrimination is wrong because it's often based on 
just bad estimates. All of us are bad with statistics. Social scientists who 
study this will tell you that people can't distinguish between the proposi-
tion most X are Y and most Yare X. So that when you tell them one, 
they easily confuse it with the other. They can't distinguish between the 
notion that one group has a greater propensity for a particular action than 
another group and the notion that an absolute majority of the former 
group has propensity to that action. We're just simply bad at making sta-
tistical inferences on a day to day basis. We tend to overestimate some 
risks and grossly underestimate other risks. 
5. The Vicious Cycle of Racial Profiling 
Fifth, rational discrimination or racial profiling creates a vicious cy-
cle. It is a self fulfilling prophecy. It proves itself to be true. Let me give 
you a simple demonstration using the numbers I have on this chalkboard. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 
+ Year 2 
Total No. of Residents 10,000 10,000 10,000 
No. of Black Residents 1,000 1,000 1,000 
% of Police Resources 25% 75% -
Devoted to Blacks 
No. of Blacks Arrested; 25; 75; 100; 
% of Blacks Arrested; 2.5%; 7.5%; 10%; 
% of Blacks without Arrest Record 97.5% 92.5% 90% 
No. of Non-Blacks Arrested; 75; 25; 100; 
% of Non-Blacks Arrested .83% .28% 1.1% 
No. of Times a Black Resident is 3 27 9 
More Likely than a Non-Black (2.5% + .83%) (7.5% + .28%) (10%+1.1%) 
Resident to Have an Arrest 
Record 
This is a demonstration, which if you know anything about statistics, 
should appall you and it is meant to appall you. It is meant to show a 
gross simplification and abuse of statistical analysis, but one that accords 
with our common sense. What I propose to do is demonstrate how if you, 
in good faith, as someone who is avowedly not a racist, decide to engage 
in rational discrimination for the purposes of controlling crime, how you 
will end up with a law enforcement policy which is hardly colorblind 
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and certainly will have effects which cause the subjugation of a racial mi-
nority group. 
Let us envision a regime in which we have a town and in this town 
there are ten thousand residents. Of these ten thousand residents a thou-
sand are Black. Now, I'm just using arbitrary numbers. I'm using nice, 
neat numbers so you can see how this works. But this isn't too far off the 
mark. So I'm envisioning a town where 10% of the population is African 
American and we'll imagine that the rest, the remaining nine thousand, 
are White, although it really doesn't matter for our purposes whether 
they're White or whether it's more racially mixed. Just that nine thousand 
are non-Black. 
Let's say you're the police chief in this town and let's say that you 
decide based on analysis, based on facts and figures, based on having 
looked at the Federal Bureau of Prisons statistics about who is incarcer-
ated-not based on prejudice at all. Let's say you decide that you want to 
target your law enforcement in a manner that is appropriate to the prob-
lem and you say "Well, where is the problem?" And let's say by looking at 
the numbers you see that there are, in fact, more African American men 
who are incarcerated as a proportion of the prison population than there 
are as a proportion of the general population. The likelihood that an Afri-
can American man has a criminal record is much higher than the 
likelihood of a similar White man, all other factors being equal. So let's 
say our hypothetical is based on these statistics, and these numbers that 
I'm giving you are true. I don't have the exact figures. But each of the 
statements that I have given you as a premise is actually true. 
So let's say you decide to allocate your resources based on these 
numbers and let's say each percentage of your resource that you allocate 
results in the arrest of one person. Okay, now these are the sorts of 
assumptions that people make in this sort of statistical analysis all the time. 
So I'm not doing anything fancy and I'm not doing anything that would 
deviate from the way you would do this if you were a proponent of these 
methods. 
All right, so you have 100% of your resources to allocate. Let's say 
that you decide to allocate 25% of your resources toward African Ameri-
cans. That is, that you're going to allocate that many more patrol cars and 
officers on the beat to African American neighborhoods, to checking out 
African American bars, or places where you know larger numbers of M-
rican Americans congregate, etc. Twenty-five percent of your effort is 
going to be targeted at African Americans, 75% targeted at Whites. You're 
still going to target the majority at Whites, but you're going to overem-
phasize slightly African Americans. 
What will happen at the end of the first year? What will happen at 
the end of the first year, if each percentage of this effort correlates to one 
arrest, is you will have arrested seventy-five Whites and twenty-five Afri-
can Americans. Now what that means is the twenty-five African 
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Americans out of the one thousand African Americans in the population 
constitute 2.5%; 97.5% of African Americans will still be good, decent, 
law abiding people. No arrest record whatsoever. Ninety-seven point five. 
That's the overwhelming majority. 
Nonetheless, because African Americans are a minority in this 
community, because they're so significantly outnumbered and make up 
only 10% of the population, what will happen if you have 25% of your 
pool of people who have been arrested out of those one hundred people 
who were arrested, twenty-five are African American. Let's say this town 
was just founded and no one else has any arrest record previously, etc. Two 
point five times more of your pool of people with arrest records will be 
African American than of the general population. Two and a half times. 
Not only that, your typical African American, just your average African 
American, your random African American. If you just pick someone who 
is African American based just on their race, they are three times more 
likely to have an arrest record than someone who is White, who is ran-
domly picked. Three times more likely, and that's if you just allocated 25% 
of your law enforcement efforts toward African Americans, and you can 
do all the numbers to double check my figures if you want. 
So now let's say in year two. You look at these numbers that you get 
at the end of year one and you say "Wow, there really is more of a prob-
lem than I thought there was." Because look at this: African Americans 
are three times as likely as Whites to have criminal records. Three times as 
likely. You might then say, "Well, I'm going to adjust my law enforcement 
strategy accordingly. I'm going to focus three quarters of my law en-
forcement resources toward African Americans and one quarter toward 
Whites." Why? Because, after all, African Americans are three times more 
likely than Whites to have criminal records. Now again, this is an utter 
and total abuse of these numbers, but I will leave it to you as clever law 
students to figure out exactly why because this is doing what rational 
discrimination asks us to do. That is, to look at the numbers. You'll see 
exactly how pernicious the results turn out to be. 
In year two, at the end of year two, you will have arrested a total of 
one hundred African Americans and one hundred Whites. You will have 
arrested those totals because you'll arrest another twenty-five Whites 
added to the original seventy-five year one arrests. Seventy-five African 
Americans added to your original twenty-five African Americans for one 
hundred from each group. (We'll ignore people who get picked up more 
than once, which is also the sort of thing that you can do for ease of use 
with an abstract model like this.) 
What then happens is 90% of African Americans in this fictional 
town are still law abiding people. Still the overwhelming majority, 90%, 
okay, because one hundred have been arrested out of a thousand. Nine 
hundred have not been.Yet, despite that, African Americans are nowover-
represented within this pool at five times their rate in the general 
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population. The general population of African Americans is 10%. In this 
pool they are 50%; overrepresentation is by five fold. That's significant 
overrepresentation. Not only that, it is nine times more likely that any 
random Mrican American who you pick up has a criminal record than it 
is of Whites. Nine times more likely. Almost an order of magnitude more 
likely. 
What this means is that in year three this rational discriminator, the 
police chief, behaving rationally, might decide to allocate 90% of law en-
forcement resources to African Americans. Well, it doesn't take long for 
you to understand that the more extreme racial profiling is, the more it 
justifies itself. If you devote 100% of your law enforcement efforts tar-
geted toward African Americans-unless people who are not African 
American bizarrely just decide to turn themselves in for committing a 
crime-you will have a pool of people who is arrested, prosecuted, and 
incarcerated that is or approaches 100% African American. In other 
words, if you have perfect racial profiling it will appear to have entirely 
justified itself. 
Now, the reason I've walked you through this exercise using these 
numbers is to show you how easily this escalates; how easy it is to create 
the illusion that a policy is rational when it's applied to a racial minority 
group. That is what we have going on in the Wen Ho Lee case where you 
initially make the assumption that there is some greater likelihood that 
someone who is of Chinese background will commit espionage for 
China, so you investigate people of Chinese background. 
Well, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if the only 
people you investigate are Chinese American, if those are your only sus-
pects, then the people you prosecute and ultimately find guilty are also 
likely to be Chinese American, regardless of whether or not they were 
actually guilty. 
6. Racial Profiling Creates Negative Incentives 
The sixth and final reason racial profiling is problematic is because of 
the incentives it creates for society as a whole. Racial profiling has a cor-
rosive effect as Randall Kennedy has noted.25 Let me make this as 
concrete as possible: let us say that we adopt the same mode of analysis 
that rational discrimination asks us to adopt. Let's say each of us behaves 
as the perfect rational actor, okay, and our morality is judged merely by 
cost benefit analysis, by what's utilitarian from our perspectives and we do 
what will result in the greatest benefit and the least cost to us. We maxi-
mize our own happiness, for that is what the rational discriminator does. 
25. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); Randall Kennedy, 
Racial Profiling Usually Isn't Racist. It Can Help Stop Crime. And it Should Be Abolished, NEW 
REpUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 30. 
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He says, "Well, it's rational for me to discriminate, therefore I'm going to 
do so." It's a racial tragedy of the commons. 
What happens now if everyone who is African American and male 
behaves rationally in this regime? If they face rational discrimination, 
what is rational behavior? Well, rational behavior for the Mrican Ameri-
can male is to be a criminal. It's rational behavior because if they are not a 
criminal, of course they don't get any of the benefits of being a criminal. 
They don't get the loot that they might steal. They don't get the cachet 
that accompanies being bad. They don't get all the other good things that 
you get from a life of crime. Yet, what do they suffer? They suffer all the 
costs. They suffer the stigma associated with criminality. They suffer being 
picked up by police, not being able to apply for jobs, not having cabbies 
pick you up. 
Not having a cabbie pick you up, well, that by itself doesn't seem 
like anything unless you understand that that's just one incident, one 
small sign of a larger pattern. 
So, if you are African American and male and you face this prejudice, 
the smartest thing for you to do, if all you're doing is behaving rationally, 
is to conform to the stereotype. 
Likewise, in the Wen Ho Lee case, the most rational behavior for an 
Asian American who works for the federal government, who is believed 
to be engaged in espionage, is in fact to engage in espionage. After all, if 
you're going to be suspected of it and bear the burden why be innocent 
of it? 
All right, I make this point which I hope is a little provocative to 
point out that mere rationality by itself is not a sufficient basis to provide 
a principle by which an individual can live, much less a principle by 
which a government would act. 
So, for all of these reasons, the rational discrimination or racial pro-
filing-call it what you will-that the government engaged in the Wen 
Ho Lee case is something we should condemn. 
III. ASIAN AMERICAN ACTIVISM 
Now, let me turn to my third point-Asian Americans and activism 
in this case-because here too I think Asian Americans made a mistake. I 
say this as someone who is Asian American, who is an activist, who has 
worked with the individuals who are active on this case. The mistake they 
made is this: if you look at some of the quotes from Asian American lead-
ers, or if you listen to the discussion within Asian American communities 
about the Wen Ho Lee case, especially within the Chinese American 
community, what you hear people saying is something like this: "Dr. Lee 
is not like drug dealers. He is not like people who are accused of those 
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sorts of crimes."26 I'm paraphrasing but that's roughly what one leader 
told the New York Times. 
What's troubling about that is that it suggests that Dr. Lee is the 
good racial minority, not the bad racial minority. What's implicit in this is 
the notion that he was presumed guilty until proven innocent. What was 
wrong with the selective prosecution and the double standard here was its 
application against a respectable elderly Ph.D. holder who did research, 
who was Asian, and implicit in the comparison with drug dealers is the 
notion that he is not like African American males-young men, thugs, 
more dangerous felons. That's what's horrible about this, is the notion that 
he was treated the way that African Americans are treated on a daily basis. 
That's what's troubling about this activism; the failure to recognize that 
this is the same problem as driving while Black but with a different face 
put on it. Not only did Asian American activists not recognize but they 
actively sought to disassociate themselves from these other issues rather 
than build bridges and form coalitions so that groups together could 
condemn racial profiling. 
Moreover, what else was interesting here is that as we talked about 
this case as a society, people made the following defense of the govern-
ment: that none of the people involved were racist; they weren't bigots. 
It's not as if they were members of the KKK, although there were suspi-
cions that one of the individuals who pursued Dr. Lee was someone who 
did have some problems with race based on a pattern of prior conduct. 
This person, who was White and male, had been involved in at least one 
lawsuit where an African American working with him as a colleague had 
sued, alleging that he had created a hostile work environment, and settled 
the case for several tens of thousands of dollars. There was some other 
evidence suggesting that this one individual may have had some racial 
animus toward Dr. Lee, that he had made some statements suggesting that 
no person of Chinese descent could be trusted.27 
Nonetheless, for the most part, I think we can agree that the prosecu-
tors who were involved-that the Department of Energy, that the Secretary 
of Energy, Bill Richardson, himself the highest ranking Hispanic in the fed-
eral government and someone who has spoken movingly about his own 
Hispanic background and having faced racial bias, and the U.S. attorney, 
who ultimately had responsibility for this case and who himself was Asian 
American-that these are people of good faith. 
It's important to understand, though, that just as rationality doesn't ex-
cuse anything, neither does good faith. It is possible to engage in rational 
discrimination while sincerely believing that you are not a racist; while sin-
cerely believing that all you're doing is relying on rational processes and 
26. See James Sterngold, Coalition Fears an Asian Bias in Nuclear Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 1999,atA1. 
27. See Sterngold, supra note 5. 
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facts. That's what's especially troubling about this form of racial bias: it's a 
form of racial bias that we don't recognize because we're prone to say "Well, 
it's true."We accept the defense of truth without asking why it is that some-
thing true of an abstract group should also be extended to cover individuals 
simply on the basis of race. We accept, all too easily, the notion that mere 
rationality is sufficient. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So let me close then finally on this thought: that in order to under-
stand the Wen Ho Lee case, in order to understand racial profiling, we must 
look at what we learned in constitutional law that every first year law stu-
dent knows: the strict scrutiny test. Strict scrutiny means that it is not 
enough to accept only rationality, that we must, when race is involved, give 
strict scrutiny to the actions of the government. When we give the actions 
of the government strict scrutiny, if that standard is to mean anything at all, 
if it is to mean more than rationality review, than what it must mean is that 
rationality by itself does not suffice. There must be something more com-
pelling as the ends. There must be narrow tailoring of the means. Strict 
scrutiny ensures that we will look closely and carefully and examine to 
make sure that our supposed rationality isn't just a mask and a cover for 
preexisting racial bias. Only when we learn how to do this, only when we 
reject merely utilitarian calculuses for a moral understanding of the obliga-
tion and guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, will we be able to 
prevent other examples of rational discrimination or racial profiling. 
Thank you. 
APPLAUSE 
V. AUDIENCE QUESTIONS 
FRANK WU: I'm happy to take questions. It's rare that you have 
the opportunity to ask a law professor questions and get a straight answer, 
as I'm sure you all know. 
QUESTION: I have a question. You mentioned that racial profiling 
provides negative, but rational, incentives for persons being profiled. For 
instance, an African American being profiled as a criminal might as well 
receive the benefits of criminal behavior if they are going to be accused 
anyway. How does this translate to Asian Americans that we often de-
scribe as "model minorities?" 
FRANK WU: Sure, one of the images of Asian Americans is "Oh, 
you're so polite" you know, and that sounds like a compliment but all 
racial stereotypes, even the ones that are complimentary are, I think, sus-
pect, because what is it to be polite? Well, to be polite is to be submissive, 
deferential, weak, not assertive. You know the last thing you want in your 
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lawyer, for example, is someone who is polite. You know if you need to 
hire someone to sue someone, you don't want to hire the most polite 
person you can find. So sometimes even these positive images can have 
their negative component just as the images of, for example, African 
Americans as natural athletes sounds on its face like a compliment but 
you don't have to go too far beneath the surface to find images of bestial-
ity. The notion that, well, it's just brute strength, it's not individual merit. 
Or that African Americans are good in certain positions in sports but not 
as the quarterback or as the coach because that requires much more intel-
ligence. 
So, some of these positive stereotypes have negative components. 
This particular stereotype of Asian Americans as being polite, I think, is 
also linked to the notion of Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners. 
You know what's interesting about the Wen Ho Lee case? Think for 
a moment about this argument: China tries to recruit spies from among 
people of Chinese descent, therefore, the US. government is entitled to 
investigate Chinese Americans or people of Chinese descent, selectively. 
What does that really say? Well, structurally that says a foreign govern-
ment, through its unilateral actions, can deprive US. citizens of their civil 
liberties. Well, that's absurd. Other than the Japanese American intern-
ment, there is no other example that I am aware of, where any court, 
where any decision maker, has accepted the notion that the actions of a 
foreign government, with which I have nothing to do, can deprive me, a 
US. citizen, of my constitutional rights. 
Yet, with Asians that logic seems to apply because Asians are regarded 
as somehow foreign, not belonging, not assimilating. You can see this, for 
example, if you look at all sorts of cases, constitutional cases. If you look 
at the cases in which the plenary power doctrine is created, where the 
court approved of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the court is very forthright 
in cases that remain good law, that haven't been overruled in saying "Here 
we're dealing with an obnoxious race-one that does not assimilate." I 
think it's captured very well by a phrase that Asian Americans sometimes 
hear, especially if they aren't polite and do dissent and are activists. The 
comment, which is sort of the flip side of the "When are you going 
home?," is the "If you don't like it here you can go back to where you 
came from." 
Well, I came from the Midwest. You know, well, I came from Cleve-
land, so I'm not quite sure what that is meant to say, but I think it's meant 
to say that you're disenfranchised.You don't have a right to articulate your 
disagreement and if you articulate your disagreement, if you are not will-
ing to accept the terms that are given to you because you are, after all, a 
guest who is here enjoying privileges and benefits not rights, well then 
you can just get lost. I often, if I have the privilege to debate something 
in a more public form, whether it's on a college campus, a t.v. show or a 
radio show, get fan mail, or more properly hate mail, with that message. 
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You know: "Go back to where you came from," or asking "Well, what do 
they do in China?" as if that has anything to do with what I'm talking 
about. 
QUESTION: You mentioned one commentator that tried to dis-
tinguish between an Asian American who had a doctorate and the 
average "driving while Black" victim. I want to be careful not to screw up 
and make that same separation because I think they're very linked. But as 
a practical matter as a movement against racial profiling, the "driving 
while Black" and other racial profiling of Blacks and Latinos seems to 
cover a wider variety of people on a daily basis, and I'm just wondering 
as a movement how that movement can include Asian Americans and Af-
rican Americans. 
FRANK WU: Sure, you know if anything, Asian Americans who are 
outraged at the Wen Ho Lee case are proving to some extent the gov-
ernment's case because their outrage is selective. Right? They're showing 
ethnic sympathies. And the last thing: one of the points I make to Asian 
American audiences is, you know, if you claim to be principled and claim 
to care about civil rights, where are you when there is a protest about 
"driving while Black?" You can't just suddenly discover the wonderful 
nature of due process and talk about all these different issues and how 
you're against police practices when it's someone who looks like you, be-
cause it's patently obvious to everyone that you only care, in this moment, 
for this particular case. And, I think you're right. If anything, it should 
be exactly the other way around. We should be much more concerned 
about the stereotyping of African Americans than Asian Americans, at 
least in this context, because law enforcement is only relatively, rarely tar-
geted at Asian Americans and only when there is a national security issue 
or only when this image of foreignness comes into play. It's much more 
often targeted against African Americans, Hispanics, and other people of 
color. But the way to make people understand, the way to make them 
sympathetic, is not to attack them. I try not to do that. I try to say "Look, 
now that you're outraged about Wen Ho Lee, now that there's been a 
good result there, how about you come out to this rally next week about 
'driving while Black'? Because if you help other groups when the issue 
has their face on it, they will then help you. But if you're not going to 
help them, they're not going to help you and you're never going to be 
able to show that this is about anything other than raw self-interest." 
In order to prevail, I think especially for racial minorities to prevail, 
the only way is through principle, not self interest. You can't just stand up 
and say "I care about Wen Ho Lee because of these lofty ideals" if you 
don't stand for those lofty ideals elsewhere. Because then people realize 
the real reason you care about Wen Ho Lee is because he is Asian like you 
and that's the worst message to send. That just confirms this view of racial 
minorities: sticking up for their own and only their own. 
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QUESTION: You mentioned that rational racial profiling and the 
idea of colorblindness are mutually exclusive. This sounds a lot like af-
firmative action opponents who are frustrated by a race conscious remedy 
being used to compensate for past racial discrimination. In the affirmative 
action context, how do you square this conflict between colorblindness 
and the need for race conscious pragmatism? 
FRANK WU: Right. That is a very good point and that's a very dif-
ficult argument to make. Let me attempt to make the argument three 
different ways. 
First, there's a difference between the original wrongdoing and the 
remedy to the wrongdoing. That is to say, that affirmative action is not the 
equivalent of chattel slavery. It is not the equivalent of Jim Crow. But, if 
you believe people who make the argument you're trying to respond to, 
they would wipe out all distinctions. In fact, that's what the court did in 
Adarand.28 It said that there is no such thing as invidious racial classifica-
tions or benign classifications. There are only racial classifications. So if 
you take that reasoning at face value, if you accept that as saying exactly 
what its authors say it says and what you intend it to say, then what you're 
really saying is slavery and affirmative action are the same. You can't dis-
tinguish between them. 
I think that while that sounds appealing in the abstract, it's just 
empirically wrong and morally reprehensible-that of course you can 
distinguish. I don't mean to put words into people's mouths. Take a look 
at the white papers written by the Regan era Justice Department where 
they make explicitly this argument.29 They argue you can't distinguish 
between affirmative action and apartheid, and they argue you can't 
distinguish between affirmative action in Nazi Germany laws that classify 
people on the basis of whether they are Jewish or not, and you can't 
distinguish between affirmative action and Jim CroW.30 So, my first 
response is: of course you can. In the abstract you can't if all you ask is the 
question "Is race involved?"Then I concede to you. You are right. Race is 
involved in the one case. Race is involved in the other case, but that's 
abstracting it to such a level that of course it's impossible to distinguish. 
That's like saying that the master and the slave are in the same position 
because each is in a relationship where race is involved. So, in the abstract, 
logically, yes, it is indistinguishable but historically and factually, I think, 
you can distinguish between a wrong and a remedy. So that's the first 
argument. 
The second argument is that there is a difference, it seems to me, be-
tween inferring a person's conduct over which they have some control, 
28. See Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
29. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REp. TO THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITIITIONALIZATION OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 16 (1987). 
30. ld. 
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and as to which we should treat everyone as individuals, and a person's 
status which they occupy as a result, not of their own free will, but just as 
a result of societal features. I'll explain what I mean. In the Wen Ho Lee 
case, the inference the government is making is one about conduct. 
They're inferring that because he is of Chinese descent, therefore he's 
more likely to betray the United States to China. It is not an inference 
about what is his status. It's an inference about what his conduct is likely 
to be. What will he do if offered the opportunity to sell secrets to China? 
With affirmative action, it is not an inference about the conduct of 
Whites or African Americans or anyone else, it is rather an inference 
about the relative status of these groups and that, if you care about Kant-
ian or these loftier notions of when it's proper to impose consequences 
on people. The answer is in a Kantian view. You can pose consequences 
when people out of their own free will have made choices. Otherwise, 
you can't attach moral consequences to things that people don't have 
control over. So, I think that distinguishes, if you want to talk in the most 
abstract philosophical way about these things, distinguishes between af-
firmative action on the one hand and invidious racial profiling on the 
other hand. 
The third argument is this-and let me be absolutely clear about 
this-I support affirmative action. I testified in the Law School case on 
behalf of the student interveners on the defense side for the school. 31 I 
have written in favor of affirmative action, testified in favor of it, and 
done all sorts of things in favor of affirmative action.32 
I get called sometimes to debate affirmative action on television or 
go to a college campus to debate it. Whenever that call comes, I try to say 
no. I try to say no as a supporter of affirmative action. I would like to 
explain why I try to say no. I try to say no because to have a debate 
suggests that this is all figuratively black and white. That there is a pro and 
a con and that there are sound bites and slogans and it's an entertainment. 
You know you go and you watch and you see how clever and witty the 
one speaker is compared to the other speaker and you have a winner and 
a loser. And that seems to me entirely misguided. What we need is not a 
debate. We need dialogue and then, more importantly than that, we need 
action. This isn't the sort of thing that you just sit in a classroom and talk 
about. It's something where you roll up your sleeves and get out there 
and do something. 
But more importantly than that, to debate affirmative action is to 
make a tremendous strategic mistake. The mistake is this: it is to start with 
the remedy. If you start with the remedy of course everyone can play on 
flaws to the remedy and then you're left talking about well, "Should we 
31. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 E Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
32. See Gabriel Chin et aI., Beyond Self-Interest:Asian PadficAmericans Toward a Commu-
nity of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129,159 
(1996). 
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abolish this program? Should we amend that program?" The right place 
to start is with racial discrimination and to have a dialogue about racial 
discrimination. And then to take action about racial discrimination and to 
ask not "Should we abolish this program or that program?" but to ask 
instead "What will we do collectively and individually to address, not just 
statistical discrimination, not just historic discrimination, not just stuff 
you read about in books but contemporary day to day racial discrimina-
tion that we still see in the gross disparities in life expectancy or infant 
mortality or employment opportunities or educational outcomes?" How 
should we address disparities in every aspect of life that we still see in hate 
crimes such as those committed in L.A., Chicago, and Pittsburgh in the 
past two years in which gunmen have targeted people who are racial and 
ethnic minorities; shot at, wounded, and killed many of them for no rea-
son other than the color of their skin?33 
The way to frame this, the way to talk about this, is to change the 
question, to have a new paradigm where we ask "What will we do?" And 
when we ask that, then it becomes apparent that affirmative action is just 
a means to an ends and affirmative action, I think that all supporters 
would agree, isn't perfect. It is not the best way to solve these problems. 
Ideally, there would be some other way to solve these problems. But it 
may be as the Bowen and Bok study showed of affirmative action with 
respect to colleges.34 It may be the only way. If you don't take race into 
account, you just can't address racial problems. So that's what's different. 
With affirmative action if you say, "Let's not take race into account" 
that's all affirmative action is: taking race into account in high stakes 
choices and decision making about who gets into this law school, for ex-
ample. Then what you're doing is eliminating the very fact the problem is 
based on but not the problem itself. To do that would be like saying the 
way to cure cancer is we're just going to become cancer-blind.You know, 
that would be the equivalent of being color-blind; we're just going to 
deny that there is cancer and that will take care of the problem. Well, that, 
I think, is simply absurd and most people would agree. So there is a 
pragmatic argument. 
So, I've given you a very concrete, factual one, an abstract theoretical 
one and now a pragmatic one that combines both of these which is, 
maybe, you're right. Maybe it is hard to distinguish, maybe it's almost im-
possible to distinguish between these cases, but if you don't allow the use 
of race for affirmative action, you simply end up with, for example, with 
University of California, Boalt Hall Law School, where you have one 
33. See, e.g., Lorraine Forte, Suit Alleges Hale Ordered Shootings, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2000, at 26; Cindi Lash & Gene Collier, Returning to the Scenes of the Crimes, PITIS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 2000, at A19; Jeff Jacoby, Laws Send the Wrong Message, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 22,2000, at A2S. 
34. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIvER (1998). 
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African American in the entire entering class and that's someone who 
deferred from the year before.35 
QUESTION: In situations like the information leak here, can't the 
government always use national security as a compelling justification for 
racial profiling? With this is in mind, what has the Wen Ho Lee case really 
changed? 
FRANK WU: Right, right. National security is the great magical 
wand that the federal government gets to wave. When it says "national 
security" the courts cower in fear and say "Oh well, if it's national secu-
rity you get to do anything." You know, look at Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist's book All the Laws But One,36 a book published just two years 
ago, where he argues basically that the internment of Japanese Americans 
was-he doesn't say it's right but he says that that's just the way that it 
would have to have been done, and that he doubts that it would be done 
any differently today. So, I think to some extent you're right, that maybe 
the government would do these things anyway.You know there's an irony 
of course to the Wen Ho Lee case, and that is if there was a Chinese spy 
no one has caught him. You know, they pursued the wrong man, they 
wasted all these resources, so they didn't even advance the interests of na-
tional security. If you look at what the government's case was-by the 
time it was filed and it had indicted Wen Ho Lee, its case had nothing to 
do with nuclear warheads with weapons, with design systems. 37 It only 
had to do with mishandling data, and government witnesses testified that 
their case had nothing to do, no connection whatsoever, with the original 
investigation that was undertaken. It's sort of like Whitewater. You know, 
transforming into something else completely. So Wen Ho Lee was pur-
sued for something unrelated to what he was initially investigated for. 
So, as far as national security goes, I'm in favor of national security 
just like everyone else. I'm a loyal American. I don't want to see the 
country overrun or China bombing the U.S. or Washington, nc., but the 
problem here is national security is just invoked and no relationship is 
shown between national security-this wonderful goal that we all agree 
with-and prosecuting and pursuing this particular person on the other 
hand. 
Let me just make a quick point about words and then I'll answer your 
question. There is something very interesting in the designation of Wen Ho 
Lee as the Chinese spy. You know that's an ambiguous phrase that was used 
in headlines all the time because Chinese spy doesn't make it clear: Is it 
someone who is spying for China or is it someone who is ethnically 
35. See Jerome Karabel, Commentary, Affirmative Action Had Real Merit; Education: 
Minority Students Accepted Under the Programs Did As l#ll As Their Regularly Admitted Coun-
terparts, L.A. TiMES, July 10,2000, at B7. 
36. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998). 
37. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 2. 
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Chinese?38 You know you could be a Chinese spy that is working for the 
Chinese government and not be of Chinese background at all. In fact, the 
recent revelations about the worst spy scandal in u.s. history that we've 
been reading about for the past couple of weeks involved someone, who, it's 
not clear what he was motivated by, but he wasn't motivated by ethnic 
ties.39 You know it's not as if it was just ethnicity that drove him to spy and 
perhaps as that case unfolds we'll learn more about it. 
Now to answer your question "What will this case do?" I think this 
case has done two things. First, it has at least galvanized Asian Americans. 
It has at least made Asian Americans aware of these issues and second, it's 
made people realize they can win one sometimes. You know it's really 
remarkable. A year ago everyone figured Wen Ho Lee was this evil, terri-
ble person, you know, who deserved, if not death, at least life in prison, 
and the only people speaking up on his behalf were cranks, lunatics-
people like me. Or people who were thought of as, "Well of course their 
speaking up for him, they're also Asian like him." And what happened? 
The government case completely collapsed. A sitting federal judge ad-
monished the Justice Department and said that the case shamed the 
nation. That rarely happens. So Wen Ho Lee's lawyers did a tremendous job 
and it shows that if you're persistent, if the facts are on your side, if you can 
prove a case the way that they were able to prove it, that you can win. And 
this is not just speculation, it's not just people sitting around and saying it 
looks like racial profiling. They got the director of counterintelligence who 
investigated Wen Ho Lee to come forward and say this was racial profiling. 
You know when that happens justice will be done. 
So I think that we can be at least somewhat optimistic. It's a huge 
mistake for the case to have been brought but at least it resolved itself 
with an outcome that was right. 
So with that I guess we're done and I'm happy to stay and chitchat. 
APPLAUSE 
38. See Marilyn Rauber, Feds Finally Slap Cuffs on China Nuke-Spy Suspect, N.Y. POST, 
Dec. 11, 1999, at 3;John Solomon, FBI Shifted China Spy Probe in '98, PilTSBURGH POST-
GAZETIE, Dec. 12,1999, at A24; Chinese Spy Investigation Shifts to Defense, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
STATE & LOCAL. WIRE, Oct. 19,2000. 
39. See Philip Shenon, From Dour 'Mortician' of EB.I. To Suspected Russian Superspy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at A1. 

